While the world\'s attention is focused on severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), pandemic influenza could be smouldering unseen. "With southern China, including Hong Kong, the epicentre of both SARS and influenza, the two diseases could easily be confused", says microbiologist Kennedy Shortridge, emeritus professor at Hong Kong University. "The recognition of a fatal case of H5N1 influenza in Hong Kong at the time of early SARS cases suggests that some reassortant influenza viruses may be close to the threshold of causing a new pandemic" (*Lancet* 2003; **361**: 268).

"If a full-blooded pandemic flu virus were to emerge now", says Shortridge, "it could leapfrog over SARS in spread, transmissibility, and presumably pathogenicity. This is why China and Hong Kong need to be on the alert for untoward infectious respiratory disease activity while dealing with SARS. Awareness and having reliable diagnostic reagents to distinguish between the two are critical".

In 1997, when avian H5N1 influenza broke out in chicken farms in Hong Kong, a pandemic of H5N1 human influenza was probably averted by killing all poultry in its markets and farms. Pandemic influenza is a zoonosis, and the death of a Hong Kong child from influenza caused by a closely related H5N1 strain raised the alarm. "This was the first documented instance of a purely avian virus causing respiratory disease and death in humans", says Shortridge. In all, 18 people caught the infection, and six died. Diligent virus surveillance after the 1997 outbreak led to swift action in 2001, when H5N1-like viruses were again spotted in Hong Kong\'s poultry markets. This time, all market poultry were slaughtered as a pre-emptive measure. Ironically, the 2001 outbreak, which Shortridge regarded as "the ultimate in prevention of a zoonotic disease", attracted less attention beyond Hong Kong, because no people were infected.

Heightened surveillance after the 1997 H5N1 episode has also paid off in getting to grips with SARS. As Nancy Cox (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA) explains, "Several individuals who played key roles during that outbreak have also played key roles in identifying the aetiological agent of SARS". The 1997 incident, she adds, "reinforced the importance of surveillance for detecting, defining, and tracking the spread of emerging respiratory diseases in Asia".

"Infectious disease intelligence-- with a chain of command from field workers through to a think tank--is vital now that the world faces changing dimensions of infectious disease", says Shortridge. "With pandemic flu and now SARS, southern China should be the main focus of attention. Particularly important will be the delineation of genes and molecular factors responsible for interspecies transmission and pathogenicity." So far, the probable animal origin of SARS coronavirus has proved elusive, although civets have lately come under suspicion (see p 399). "Most viruses that are new to a species are found to have a reservoir in another species", says Trevor Drew (Veterinary Laboratories Agency \[VLA\], Weybridge, UK), "but no one yet knows where Sara comes from".

In Shortridge\'s view, the avian dimension of pandemic influenza can hardly be overplayed, given the intensification of the poultry industry worldwide. Fears of a possible pandemic were raised again earlier this year when an H7N7 avian influenza virus that swept through Dutch poultry farms infected about 100 people. Most had conjunctivitis without systemic symptoms, but one (with respiratory symptoms) died. "The potential of avian influenzas to cause a human pandemic depends largely on their transmissibility from person to person, which hasn\'t happened to any extent in the Dutch outbreak", says Ian Brown, of the VLA. "A pandemic strain could also arise through reassortment of viral genes in a person coinfected with avian and human influenza viruses." The risk of coinfection is now low in Europe, because the flu season is ending. H9N2 virus is another worry: "Its isolation in pigs and humans in Hong Kong suggests it might be a greater threat than H7N7 both in and beyond the epicentre", says Shortridge.

Veterinarian David Halvorson (University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, USA) agrees that "control of all animal influenza is turning out to be much more important than we initially thought. Now it appears we need to be much more careful in our regard for the ability of viruses from one species to cause harm in another". In Halvorson\'s view, biosecurity (eg, controlled marketing of vaccinated and convalescent flocks) and vaccination are key control measures. "It is also time", says Shortridge, "to review animal husbandry practices that facilitate the generation of pandemic agents".

The experts are getting the measure of influenza, and they know vigilance is vital. As for SARS, says Shortridge, "it\'s hard to say how this coronavirus activity will eventually turn out. It might simply be smouldering, both in the epicentre and (by virtue of air travel) at many points around the world. This begs the question of whether it will become endemic globally or give rise to the big bang in true pandemic fashion".
